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Case No. 7259 
. IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
t ~RA H.. McKENZIE, Widow of 
·-.,·.:Owen _ll'eKenzie, deee_ased, 
vs. 
. . . 
'fHE INDUSTRIAL· COMMISSION 
OF. UT.A.Ii:, HAROLD J. WiiiT-
:ifNG, M. _VERL WffiTING and J. 
~~vrn HAYMPND; do~g·busi­
ness as WHITING ·AND HAM-
MOND, :·C9ntractors, · and WEST- · 
,~N NATIONAL INDEMNITY 




.. .. .. . RW,QUINNEY & NE'BEKER, 
·:l~AR 261941 · · · · · 
· ·. . A~torneys for D·efendants · 
-~~----·~·-·------- ·-·-_... OLEIK, etiPIIEM£ COURT, u11id ftespondents. -·· _. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FLORA H. :JicKENZIE, widow of 
Owen :McKenzie, deceased, 
Plaintiff, 
YS. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, HAROLD J. WHIT-
ING, ~I. VERL WHITING and J. 
:MELY1N HAYMOND, doing busi-
ness as WHITING AND HAM-
MOND, Contractors, and WEST-
ERN NATIONAL INDEMNITY 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7259 
If this court finds any substantial evidence to support 
the decision of the Industrial Commission denying com-
~nsation, that decision must be affirmed. Respondents 
respectfully submit that the record contains more than 
sufficient of such evidence, and to prove that such is 
the fact they ask ,the court to consider further the tes-
timony presented to the Commission. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Owen McKenzie was ~atally_ injured in Salt Lake 
County, Utah, on Saturday,. November 29, 1947, while a 
passenger in an automobile belonging to the construction 
firm of Whiting and Haymond, Contractors, a partner-
ship consisting of the defendants Harold J. Whiting, 
W. Verl Whiting and J. Melvin Haymond. The deceased 
was, at the time, going from his plaee of work in Garland, 
Utah, to his home in Springville, Utah. His work had 
stopped some three hours before the accident and he 
was making the trip only to spend the week-end at home 
('Tr. 43, 47). Just prior to the accident, he had worked 
for the construction company at Garland for about three 
months as a dump man (Tr. ·so, 82, 83). 
The car in which Mc~enzie was riding on this par-
ticular trip was a Studebaker passenger car, and was 
nearly always reserved for the personal use of Mr. 
Haro~d Whiting, one of the partners ('Tr. 78, 83). Mr. 
F. M. Cramner, the company's superintendent of the 
Garland job, was driving the Studebaker. Mr. McKenzie 
was injured when the car collided with another automo-
bile at the intersection of 5th East and 39th South 
Streets in :Salt Lake County. 
Normally, the company's superintendent used the 
company's pickup truck for his company trav,els, which 
included his week-end trips from Garland to Springville 
and return. He testified, and without dispute, that he 
II., 
~~ 
used the pickup only when he had company supplies ,~ 
or equipment to bring to or from the job (Tr. 40, 41). 
The Studebaker was never used by the superintendent 
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3 
except on the day of the accident ( Tr. 32). J\1r. Harold 
Whiting told ~Ir. Cramner, just after quitting time at the 
Garland joh on this particUlar Saturday, that he could 
take the StudBbaker to Springville that day because he, 
Whiting, had to stay at the scene of work for a little 
while longer, and needed the pickup to haul some equip-
ment to Springville (Tr. 34, 44, 83). The superintend-
ent's home and the company's repair and storage shops 
were located. at Springville ( Tr. 77). Whiting never told 
McKenzie that he could ride with Cramner nor is there 
evidence that he knew that :McKenzie was going in the 
Studebaker ( Tr. 83, 92). Some of the contractors were 
having a party at Springville on the foUowing Monday 
night and McKenzie was invited. Harold Whiting and 
Cramner both testified ·that this party was the reason for 
bringing the Studebaker down to Springville to use on 
Monday (Tr. 35, 81). 
No evidence was presented to the Commission that 
the company had any control over Mr. Cramner or Mr. 
McKenzie while they rode to Springville on that fateful 
Saturday, nor at any time after they quit work about 
2:00 o'clock p.m. that afternoon. McKenzie and the other 
employees could return to their homes by any means 
they might choos·e. 
Furthermore, Mr. McKenzie and Mr. Cramner, the 
superintendent, were not the sole beneficiaries of Mr. 
Whiting's accommodation that day. Mr. Fryer, Mr. 
Taylor and Mr. Shoell, company emp[oyees, all rode 
in the Studebaker, and Cramner, who was driving, made 
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4 
a stop at Salt Lake City to let out a passenger who 
happened to live there (Tr. 47, 59, 67). 
The deceased, Mr. McKenzie, had been employed by 
the construction company as superintendent on a pre-
vious job at Malad, Idaho, ending in July of 1947. He 
then had used the company's pickup truck for trips to 
Springville when it was necessary for company business. 
Both l\fcKenzie's wife and daughter testified that when 
he brought the truck to Springville, he would pick up 
machine parts and other company supplies (Tr. 15, 28). 
The pickup truck was for the superintendent's own 
company use, but not for his own personal convenience. 
Mr. McKenzie never used this truck during the Garland 
job, and Cramner testified that he, Cranmer, on~y drove 
it to Springville when he had something to haul for the 
company (Tr. 37, 42). The headquarters of the com-
pany were at all times located at Springville, and it was 
part of the superintendent's duties to keep the job sup-
plied with materials and parts. Mr. Cramner testified 
that when he did not have such equipment to transport, 
he did not use the pickup but obtained a ride to Spring-
ville, or to Garland, with other employees. On one occa-
sion he and Mr. McKenzie rode home in Mr. Fullmer's 
car (Tr. 41). He did not feel that he had any right to 
use the pickup except on company business. Its chief 
use was to carry parts (Tr. 40, 41). Mr. Harold Whiting 1; 
testified that no employee was permitted to use company 
equipment, such as the pickup, for his own purposes, in-
cluding transportation to and from work ('Tr. 91). 
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The testin1ony of all of the witnesses proves that 
:\IcKenzie was not in a status different from the other 
employees in regard to transportation to and from their 
homes. Lee Taylor, another e1nployee of the company 
on the Garland job, also lived at Springville. He ~testi­
fied that he had ridden to and from work in the Stude-
baker at various tin1es, but that he had first asked ~T r. 
\Yhiting if he had room. At other times he had requested 
and received a ride \\ith Cramner in the pickup ( Tr. 70). 
Mr. Taylor also stated that he and l\IcKenzie had ridden 
home a "couple of times" with ~1:r. Harwood, a company 
employee, and that Taylor contributed to the payment of 
Mr. Harwood's travel expense on such trips (Tr. 69, 72). 
It is without dispute that neither Harwood nor any 
other worker received compensation from their employer 
for such travel expense. It is also undisputed that none 
of the employees, including McKenzie, were ever paid, 
regardless of the place of work, for travel time to and 
from home (Tr. 40, 72, 76, 77, 79). 
nir. Fryer, another Garland employee, had ridden to 
his home at Provo in the pickup on various week-ends, 
and had also used his own car or ridden in the cars of 
other employees. He once drove the pickup to 'Spring-
ville to pick up some company equipment. On that trip 
he also gave another employee a ride back to the job 
(Tr. 60). He corroborated Mr. Whiting's testimony that 
he, Fryer, rode in ~the Studebaker on the day of the acci-
dent because Whiting had at that time offered him a 
ride ('Tr. 59). When Mr. Fryer worked for the con-
struction company at Green River, Wyoming, he had 
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6 
sometimes ridden the bus to his home in Provo. He was 
never reimbursed by the. company for this expense, nor 
for using his own car in traveling to and from his home 
( Tr. 56, 57). C1arence Shoell tes'tified that he had not 
only . ridden with Fullmer and another employee named 
Harwood, while traveling home from the Garland job, 
but that he had sometimes used his own car at his own 
expense. He had worked continuously nine years for 
the company and did not know of any instance where 
the company reimbursed any of the men for the expense 
of operating their own ears to and from work. He .also 
was a passenger in the Studebaker on the day of the 
accident, but could not recall who had asked him to 
ride (Tr. 60). Mr. Harold Whiting testified that any 
of the men who so desired were welcome to ride with him 
to and from their homes, provided he had room. How-
ever, if he was not returning to the job, the men would 
have to obtain a return ride from someone else (Tr. 90, 
92). Mr. Cramner, who was cal1ed as plaintiff's own 
witness, testified that it was not the policy of the com-
pany to transport employees to and from. work When 
supe~intendent, he would take men ·with him in the 
pickup to ~their homes in or near Springville, if he had 
room, "but nobody gave ... orders to do it" ('Tr. 49). 
On the trip to Springville on the day in question, he 
did not ask or require the assistance of McKenzie on 
any company business. In fact, he never did require 
such assistance at any time when he. took McKenzie to 
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~-\.t the time of the accident, the company employed 
between twenty-five and forty men on the Garland job. 
Some of them resided in Southern Idaho (Tr. 76). They 
furnished their own means of transportation to and from 
work, and the company never authorized or allowed them 
to use any company equipment for this purpose, nor did 
the company ever furnish any gas or oil or reimburse 
them for such travel expense (Tr. 65, 7.6). An the em-
ployees who used their own cars appear to have had a 
''share the ride'' program of some kind to equalize the 
cost between them of the travel to and from their homes 
(Tr. 63, 69). :Mr. Whiting estimated that about ten 
men working on the Garland job lived in the Provo area 
on the date in question. There is no evidence that the 
company furnished any specific transportation for them 
(Tr. 76). They were welcome to ride in any vehicle, 
whether it belonged to the company or one of the em-
ployees, provided there was room, and provided the 
company vehicle was going to Springville on company 
business. 
The facts surrounding the actual employment con-
tract between the company and Mr. McKenzie further 
demonstrate that he was not in the course of his employ-
ment when the fatai accident occurred. He had been 
working some three months at Garland for the company, 
and, like the other employees, was always paid by the 
hour. McKenzie and the others would work through ~the 
week until some time around Saturday noon, and then 
all except one or two employees were free to go home 
until the following week (Tr. 38, 79, 80). Most of them 
' 
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including McKenzie, while on the job lived at the scene 
of the Garland work in •trailers furnished by the com-
pany, and paid for their own board (Tr. 79). On the 
Saturday of the accident, Mr. McKenzie had quit work 
about 2:00 o'elock, at which time his pay stopped. He 
was not required to do any company work over the 
week-ends, nor was his trip ~to Springville on November 
29, 1947, connected in any way with the company's busi-
ness (Tr. 46, 79). His pay was the same as that of the 
truck drivers and neither his nor the other employees' 
compensation depended on how far they had to go to 
and from their homes or what transportrution they used 
(Tr. 40, 86). 
Appellant's brief makes much of the question 
whether McKenzie was employed at Garland as foreman. 
Respondents are unable to see how this point has any 
bearing on the issue now before the court. The fatal 
accident was either in or out of the course of McKenzie's 
employment because of the contract of employment and 
not because he might have been working as a foreman 
on the day he was injured. He would not have any 
right to demand company transportation merely from 
the faet that he might have been foreman. The record 
contains no evidence of such a privilege or right be-
longing to any employee, foreman or not. The record, 
furthermore, presents substantia~ and very reliable 
testimony that McKenzie was not a foreman at any time 
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on the Garland job, and on the day of the accident. 
His employer, Harold \Yhiting, "·lw was in charge of 
the work and the In en at Garland, testified emphatically 
that :McKenzie was no foreman, but was employed only 
as a dump man. His pay was the same as that of the 
truck drivers (Tr. 86). In addition, there is no evi-
dence that :JicKenzie gave any orders on the job, or tha;t 
he was in charge of any men, or performed any other 
duties which would fall upon a forema;n. 
:McKenzie's work on the Garland job was to be 
completed on the Tuesday following the accident, and 
there is no testimony as to how he was to return to 
Garland to finish his job. Neither Mr. Cramner nor 
Harold Whiting knew how Mr. McKenzie intended to 
return (Tr. 38, 90). Mr. Camner testified that he was 
returning in the pickup on Monday morning without 
McKenzie (Tr. 38). These facts are proof that the 
company never assumed nor was under any duty or 
obHgation to provide Mr. McKenzie wi~th transportation 
to or from his home. He had to make what arrange-
ments he could for such travel. When, as on the date 
of the accident he did obtain a ride in a company car, it 
was at most an accommodation on the part of the em-
ployer. 
After ~the hearing, the Commission, on August 24, 
1948, found that the accident did not arise out of or in 
the course of the employment of the deceased. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  




THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S DECISION THAT 
McKENZIE'S INJURY AND SUBSEQUENT DEATH DID 
NOT ARISE OUT OF OR IN THE COURSE OF HIS EM-
PLOYMENT IS SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD AND MUST 
BE AFFIRMED. 
It is the establi~hed rule of this court that if any 
substantial evidence exists in the record to support the 
decision of the Industrial Commission, then that deci-
sion must stand. To set aside the Commission's decision, 
this court must hold, as a matter of law, that there is 
no such evidence. The court, in these cases, does not 
weigh the conflicting evidence, or attempt to replace 
the Commission as the trier of the facts. Roberts v. 
lrndustrial Commission, 87 Utah 10, 47 P. (2d) 1052. 
After hearing all of the testimony presented by 
both parties, the Commission made its finding that the 
injuries which caused Owen McKenzie's death did not 
arise out of or in the course of hi~ employment. Respond-
ents submit that under the decisions of this court, the 
Commission's order denying compensation is supported 
by the testimony and must be affirmed. 
A general ru~e of law announced and repeatedly 
affirmed by this and other courts of the country is that 
while going to or from his· place of work, a worker is 
not in th~ course of his employment. Here, decedent, 
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Garland, to his hon1e in Springville, Utah, when he 
receiYed fatal injuries in an automobile accident at Salt 
Lake County, Utah, some 65 miles from Garland. His 
pay and working hours for the week had ended approxi-
mately three hours before the accident. When he was 
fatally injured, he was riding in his employer's Stude-
baker passenger car being driven by his employer's 
superintendent. Deceased's only reason for making the 
trip was to spend the week-end at his home. Further-
more, he had on other occasions ridden home from his 
place of employment in other employees' cars. He was 
in the Studebaker and in the fatal accident, only beaause 
he ha.ppened to reside where the car was going on oom-
pany business and because there was room for him to 
ride. 
This court, under a set of facts more favorable to 
the employee than in the instant case, reversed the Indus-
trial Commission and held that a worker travelling 
to his work in a company owned truck was not then in the 
course of his employment. Denve.r & R. G. W. R. Co. v. 
lnd.u.strial Commission, et al, 72 Utah 199, 269 P. 512. 
There, the employer, a railroad, furnished a truck to 
carry its track workers, including Massey, the decedent, 
from the section house at Price, Utah, to their place of 
work some ten miles away. This truck also brought the 
men back at the end of their work day. The Railroad em-
ployed a driver for this purpose, and he supplied the car. 
Four or five of the employees had made it a practice to 
get on the truck at a place about three-quarters of a mile 
from the section house. The other employees reached the 
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12 
section house by their own means of transportation. The 
employer's foreman had observed Massey and others 
riding to the section house upon the truck but had never 
objected. Massey was employed by the day and was paid 
by the hour, his time being computed from when he left 
the section house in the morning until he returned in the 
evening. Massey was killed when the truck collided with 
another automobrle while carrying him and the other 
workers to the section house for their day's work. 
The Utah Industrial Commission found that Massey 
was killed in the course of his employment. This court 
held to ~the contrary and set aside the award. 'The em-
ployment did not "contemplate" transportation to the 
place of work. The court ruled that the risks and 
hazards of going to the section house were not within 
the employer's engagement, and so did not come within 
or arise out of the employment. 
''Upon the facts, we think it plain that the 
employment in the present case inc~uded the 
transportation of the employee by the employer 
only from the section house to and from his place 
of work. That was the limit of the employer's 
engagement both with the employee and the truck 
driver. Before arrival at the section house in 
the morning, neither wer;e under the control or 
direction of the employer. The truck driver, in 
permi'!.ting the employee to ride with him on the 
truck to the section house acted entirely on his 
own account and the employee was free to choose 
his own way of getting to the section house with-
out any direction or control by his employer. We 
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13 
the enlployer's foremOJn on prevli01JS OCCasvons 
saw the employees riding on the tntck to the sec-
t-ion house and said nothing abont it. We are led 
bY the facts in this case to conclude that the rela-
tion or status of the parties herein as employer 
and employee did not exist until the employee 
reported for duty at the section house." (Italics 
ours). 
In our own case, the evidence does not even estab-
lish that the employer, \Vhiting and Haymond, furnished 
the pickup truck for the transportation of its employees. 
On the contrary, both the superintendent, Mr. Cramner, 
and :Jir. Harold \\TJ!iting established without dispute 
that the truck was for the pur:pose of carrying parts 
from the consbruction job to the .repair shop·s at Spring-
ville and back again. McKenzie's position is even less 
favorable than that of ~fassey in other respects. 'The 
driver of the Massey truck was specifical'ly employed to 
drive the worker to and from the job, and there was no 
statement in the decision that Massey ever travelled to 
the section house by any means other than the company-
furnished truck. 
In Ogden Transit v. Industrial Commissvon, 95 Utah 
66,79 Pac. (2nd) 17, the employer bus company furnished 
a bus called the ''owl'' at the end of each day for the 
convenience of its employees. They were entitled to 
ride free to their homes or elsewhere. Decedent, Ferrin, 
worked as a bus driver, and was killed by an automo-
bile as he was crossing the street on his way home im-
mediately after alighting from the "owl'' run bus. 
Whi~e on this bus he had been working on some of his 
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14 
bus operator's reports required by his job. Because of 
the location of the bus stop, Ferrin had to cross the 
street in order to reach his home. He made it a custom 
of riding this S'Pecial bus home at the ·end of 'each day's 
work. In setting aside the award of compensation to 
Ferrin's widow, this court rejected the argument that 
Ferrin came within any exception to the general rule, 
such as special mission doctrine or t;he dangerous ap-
proach theory of Cudahy Packing Go., v. lndustrwl 
Commission, 60 U. 161, 207 P. 148, affirmed 2'63 U. S. 
418, 68 L. Ed. 366, 30 A.L.R. 532. The opinion ruled 
that Konopka v. Jackson County Bo:ad Comm., 258 N. W. 
429 (Mich.), on which this appellant's brief emphatically 
relies, was ''not in point because there was no contract 
which obligated the company to transport the employee 
to and from work in the sense used in such cases." 
The court aJ.so, refused to find that Ferrin's habit 
of using the "owl" run gave rise to any such contractual 
ob1igation: 
"'There was no obligation on the employer 
by contract or custom to transport Ferrin to the 
regular stopping point on the east side of Wash-
ington Avenue at Cross Street. The contract of 
the employee with the Company was merely that 
he ·would be transported free of fare on any bus 
of the company on its regular run. The company 
made it convenient for employees to use the 
''owl'' run by starting the busses at the car barns. 
The employee was free to leave the bus at any 
regular stopping place. The fact that he usually 
got off at the stopping point nearest his home 
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did not obligate the company to always, under 
any and an circumstances, take him to that point.'' 
In our own case, appellant contends that McKenzie's 
employer has established a custom, and had impliedly 
agreed to furnish him transportation to and from Mc-
Kenzie's home each week-end. In the Ogden Trans~t 
decision, supra, this court gave answer to such an argu-
ment: 
''Ferrin wore a badge which served as a 
free pass, permitting him to ride free on any of 
the busses on regular runs. He was at liberty to 
board a bus or leav:e it at any regular stop .... 
This custom of Ferrin's cannot be transposed 
into a contract obligation of the employer to de-
liver him at the stopping point, extending the 
place of his employment to that point." 
The general rule that a worker is not in the course 
of his employment when travelling to and from his place 
of work was first declared and applied by this court in 
North Po!int Oonsol. Irr. Co. v. Industrial Commission 
of Utah, et al, 61 Utah 421, 214 P. 22. In the case now 
before us, appellant would have the court make an excep-
tion to this rule where none existed before. Let us see 
whether the decisions of Utah's highest court justify 
such a position. In the North Point case, supra, the em-
ployer's foreman told plaintiff and other employees that 
he would furnish a ride to work for them if they would 
meet at a certain time. The foreman was unable to get 
the automobile, and plaintiff started on his bicycle to 
his place of work. He was injured by a collision with a 
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car before he reached his destination. In annulling the 
Commission's award, this court stated: 
''Here the foreman, without authority from 
the plaintiff, undertook to provide transportation 
for the workmen as a mere accommodation to 
them, and not because plaintiff was in any way 
obligated to do so.'' 
The court, as further authority for its ruling, quoted 
a Massachusetts decision, Leveroni v. Travelers' Ins. 
Co., 107 N. E. 349, as follows: 
'' 'The contract of employment did not pro-
vide for transportation or that he should be paid 
for the time taken in going and returning to his 
place of employment, and when the day's work 
had ended the employee was free to do as he 
pleased. If he had chosen to use the public ways 
and had been injured by a defect or passing ve-
hicle, the administrator could not recover against 
the employer because there would be no causal 
connection between the conditions of employment 
and the injuries suffered. ' '' 
This court's observations in the above case singular-
ly fit the situation now before the court. Appellant here 
proved no agreement of any kind on the part of the 
employer to furnish Mr. McKenzie with a ride to and 
from his home. He received no compensation for such 
travel time, and was certainly then not under his em-
ployer's direction, or furthering his own emp~oyment. 
Cramner, his superintenden't, testified without contradic-
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in any con1pany business when going to and from Spring-
ville, and particularly on the day of the accident. The 
duties of his job ended when he quit work that day at 
Garland. 
This court has consistently followed the rule of the 
North Point case, supra, while pointing out some excep-
tions, in a number of decisions: Co1.;·ey-Ballard Motor Co., 
et ,al v. Industrial Comm!ission, 64 Utah 1, 227 Pac. 1028; 
Bountif'u{ Brick Company vs. Giles, 68 Utah 600, 251 P. 
555; D. and R. G. v. Industrial Comrniission, supra; Kahn 
Brothers v. Industrial Commission, 75 Utah 1.f5, 283 
Pac. 1054; Fidelity and Casualty Company v. Industrial 
Commission, 79 Utah 189, 8 Pac. (2d) 617; Roberts v. · 
Industrial Commission, 87 Utah 10, 47 Pac. (2d) 1052; 
Edwards v. Indust.rial Commission, 87 Utah 127, 48 Pac. 
(2d) 459; Ogden Tran~it Company v. Industr~al Commis-
sion, supra; Greer v. Industrial Commission, 74 Utah 
379, 279 Pac. 900; Vivag'raph v. Industr~al Commission, 
96 Utah 100, 85 Pac. · (2d) 601; London Gua11antee & 
Accident v. Frazee, et al, (Utah) 185 P. (2d) 284. 
In the Greer case, the employee, when injured on his 
way to work, was carrying a saw which he used on the 
job and had taken home the previous night to sharpen. 
He was struck by a car as he walked across the highway 
to catch a ride with a fellow workman. The court refused 
to be influenced by the fact that the employee had the 
saw when killed. In upho~ding the Commission's denial 
of compensation, the oprinion cites a California ·case, 
London Guarantee and Accident Oo. v. Industrti;al Com-
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mission, et ,al, 213 P. 977. There the petitioner took some 
office work home wi'th him and was injured in leaving 
his home that same day to return to the office. 'This 
court quoted from the decision as follows: 
'' 'Exceptions to the general rule are cases 
where an employe, either in his employer's or 
his own time, is going to or from his place of 
employment on some substantial mission for his 
employer growing out of his employment. In such 
cases it is he~d that the employe is within the 
protection of the act. But the mission must be 
the major factor in the journey or movement, and 
not merely incidental thereto ; that is to say if 
incidental to the main purpose of going to or from 
the place of employment, it would not bring such 
person under the protection of the act.' '' 
The Greer case concludes with the observation that 
''the dangers of the street between his home and the 
stockyards were not incident to his employment, but 
were dangers common to all.'' So, in the instant case, 
the fact that McKenzie was in the company's car when 
fatally injured did not change the nature of the dangers 
of travel. Whether he had been in another employee's 
car, his own car, or that of his employer, the dangers 
remained the same, and furthermore, his mission or 
purpose in going to Springville was on~y to reach his 
home. 
The Utah case of Fidelity and Casualty CompaiYIJY v. 
Industrial Commission, supra, reaffirms the general rule 
and reviews its exceptions enunciated by this court. 
There, an employee rode a bicycle daily to and from the 
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company's plant, and had definite working hours. Every 
morning on his way to work he was required to pick up 
films for his employer at the Semloh Hote'l and take 
them to the plant at Salt Lake City. Whi1le he was pro-
ceeding to the hotel on his bicycle to accomplish this 
errand, he was struck and killed by an automobile some 
three miles distant frOin his hotel. At the time he carried 
a bag in which he would put the films. The court ruled 
that the fact that he was on such an errand and was 
carrying a bag did not take the employee out of the gen-
eral rule. Said the court: 
" ... At the time Edwin received the injuries 
which caused his death he was in no sense under 
the control of his emp;loyer. If the testimony of 
Mr. Peck is to be 1believed, his employment did 
not begin until he reached the Semloh Hotel. He 
was at perfect liberty to take whatever course 
he desired in reaching the Semloh Hotel. The 
time when he was to enter upon his employment 
had not yet arrived. Under the facts in this case 
we are unable to perceive of any reason why the 
general rule, that an employee on his way to work 
is not within the protection of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act, does not apply. 
'' ... It may be noted that the deceased could 
call at 'the Semloh Hotel without deviating from 
his course of travel in coming from his home to 
the plant of his employer. If the place of em-
ployment of the deceased had been at the Semloh 
Hotel, there would be no doubt under the author-
ities that Mrs. Shufelt would not be entitled to 
an award of compensation because of his death." 
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This court affirmed the Commission's refusal to 
grant compensation to plaintiff in Roberts v. Industrial 
Oommission, supra. ·The evidence there was that em-
ployer's foreman ca!lled the deceased employee by tele-
phone and told him to report at Soldier's Summit, Utah, 
as soon as possible on a eertain day to relieve another 
employee. The deceased employee, Roberts, was in the 
habit of using his own car for his trips to and from his 
place of work. Some evidence existed that the foreman 
had told Roberts to use his own car, and it was appar-
ent that the foreman knew the employee would use his 
car. Evidence was presented that Roberts could, if he 
so desired, use the train to reach the Summit. On his 
way to the appointed place of work, he was killed in a 
collision invo~ving his car and another automobile. Deny-
ing compensation, this court commented as follows: 
''He would be called to work whenever he was 
needed. The mere fact that he was urgently 
needed or was told to report as soon as possib~e 
on any particular occasion would not change the 
nature of his employment or convert his going to 
work to perform duties ordinarily performed by 
him into some special errand or service." 
The fact that a worker, while walking on his em-
ployer's property, was injured as he was going toward 
his living quarters to get his working tools has been held 
by this court as insufficient to place the accident with 
the course of employment. Edwards v. Industtiial Com-
mission, supra. The plaintiff there argued that the case 
was within the Compensation Act because the employer 
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controlled and owned the premises where he was hurt. 
This court, in answer, said: 
"~\s stated in "\Vheeler's case, 131 :.Me. 91, 
159 ~\. 331, the test is not so much as to whether 
the employer owns or controls the place where 
the injury occurred, but rather, whether H hap-
pens on the premises where the work is to be 
performed.'' 
This decision, like other opinions of this court, dis-
tinguishes the Cudahy and Bountiful Brick cases, supra. 
Plaintiff's brief here relies on the rule of those two 
cases. In the Edu)a.rds case, the court commented upon 
that rule in the following language: 
''The principle which appear to support these 
two cases is that the approach to the employment 
involved a peculiar and abnormal exposure to 
danger which was annexed as a risk incident to 
the employment contemplated and included in it-
self such risk to such dangers. In the instant case, 
the injury occurred, not in the immediate ap'-
proach to the work, but 800 to 1,000 feet away 
from the tipple. 
"In the case at bar, therefore, it is quite 
apparent, if we give the plaintiff the benefit of 
every inference from the evidence, that he was, 
as far as the record reveals, in the same situation 
as an employee who lived off the company's prop-
erty, who had not arrived at the place of work, 
and who was not traversing over a right of way or 
approach which was inherently dangerous and 
which was either the sole means of approach or 
the natural, practical, customary, and convenient 
approach as compared to all other approaches.'' 
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In our own situation, it cannot be maintained by any 
stretch of logic that McKenzie was injured while passing 
over a right of way inherently dangerous; or that such 
right of way was an immediate approach to the place of 
work or that its dangers were within the employment 
contemplated by the parties to the employment contract. 
To so hold, would place every foot of roadway travelled 
by McKenzie and the other employees in going to and 
from work, within the Cudahy and Bowntiful Brick rule. 
In the V itagrla;ph case, supra, this court answered 
any contention of this plaintiff that McKenzie, when . 
injured, was not only going home but was serving his 
employer. That opinion, in holding against an employee 
who was taking some work reports home at the time of 
the accident, ruled that: 
'' ... To establish liabiHty the inference must 
be permissible that even though the private errand 
were cancelled the trip would have been made.'' 
Defendants agree that the contract of employment 
may contemplate the furnishing of transportation. Such 
transportation may, under certain circumstances, be part 
of the consideration for which the worker accepts the 
job. But such was not McKenzie's situation. No evi-
dence is in the record that he or any other employee at 
the Garland job or elsewhere was ever told or made to 
understand that the company would furnish ~transpor­
tation to and from the workers' homes. No emp1oyee 
was shown to have received reimbursement for such 
travel expense. Some ten of the Garland employees, 
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including :J[cKenzie, lived in the Springville-Provo area, 
and while any of them was welcome to ride home in a 
company autonwbile that was g·oing on company busi-
ness (which included driving nir. Whiting's Studebaker 
to Springville), such transportation was not furnished 
them by the company as a contract right or under any 
custom or agreement that they could demand a ride 
whether or not a car was going on such company business. 
The employees who lived in :Malad and at other poin1ts 
north of Garland, never rode to or from their homes in 
company transportation or at company expense because 
there were no company cars having company errands in 
that area. The fact that ~IcKenzie and certain of the 
others happened to live in the Springville area, where 
the employer's shops were located and the company of-
ficials lived, does not change an accommodation into a 
contract right. 
Such rides home as the Garland employees received 
in the company's vehicles were a gratuity or accommo-
dation on the part of the employer, and in this regard, 
McKenzie cannot be placed in a class apart from the 
other men. The nature of such occasional transporta-
tion is well il1ustrated in Goldsworthy v . .Schreiber et al, 
(Wis.), 250 N. W. 427. The facts were very similar to 
those of the present case. Goldsworthy, as a contractor, 
employed workers on a building contract about 37 miles 
from Beloit, Wisconsin. About fourteen men, including 
the deceased employee, Schreiber, resided in Beloit but 
spent the week in camp at the scene of the work. The 
employer supplied 1board and room. 'Some of the other 
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men lived elsewhere, and aN were employed from Mon-
day morning to Saturday noon. The men could remain 
at the camp over the week-end, but they were then obliged 
to do their own cooking. The evidence is that only one 
man at a time remained at the camp over the week-end. 
The employer ran a truck to Beloit each week-end, leav-
ing Saturday afternoon. The employer himself testified 
that he had told the men that there would Halways be 
a truck coming back on Saturday night and back down 
on Sunday night.'' It was usual and customary for a 
number of the men, including Schreiber, residing in 
Beloit to ride in this truck in order to spend Sunday at 
their homes. One Sunday evening, however, Schreiber 
returned to the camp in a car of a co-emp~oyee. ·This 
arrangement was made with the knowledge and consent 
of the employer. On ·this trip Schreiber was fatally in-
jured in an automobile accident. The Wisconsin court 
held that the employer's transportation arrangement did 
not create an obligation resting upon him by virtue 
of the terms of the contract of employment. ''Our fun-
damental inquiry is whether he had a right to transpor-
tation by his employer." The court held that he had 
no such right. 
"But here the employees were maintained 
in a camp established at the works. They were 
privileged to stay in the camp over Sunday if they 
so desired, hut they chose to return to their homes 
at the week-end and spend Sunday with their 
families. It will not be so readily inferred (if 
the inference be permissible at all) that the trans-
portation furnished by the employer under such 
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circu1nstances was in the discharge of a contract-
ual obligation, because the occasion therefor did 
not arise from the necessities of the employment. 
It was merely for the gratification of the employ-
ees. 
"The transportation so furnished was not in 
any manner a necessity for the prosecution of the 
employer's business. Not all of his employees 
came from Beloit, and the.re lis no suggestion in 
the record that transportation was furnished to 
any except Beloit employees. Neither does it 
appear that it was in any wise necessary in order 
to enable the employees to return to their home. 
It appears from the record that there was a bus 
and other transportation from Beloit to points in 
convenient proximity to the camp. It also appears 
that, although the employer's truck was availablle 
for transportation, some of the employee's went 
back and forth in their own cars." (Italics ours.) 
The Wisconsin court based its decision upon the 
nature of the transportation furnished in the employer's 
truck and not upon the fact that the employee was killed 
while riding in a car of another emp~oyee. The court 
a1so made a distinction, not often drawn, between the 
case of daily transportation for the employees, and a 
weekly provision by 1the employer for the men's travel 
to· and from home. 
Appellant, in her brief, advances the Washington 
case of Venho v.· Ostr1ander Railway and Timber Com-
pany, 52 P. (2d) 1267, to support her argument. That 
decision had to do with the employer's furnishing its 
employees with a ride on its logging train ''as an inci-
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dent of their employment.'' That same court, in a later 
decision, established that its ruling there would not apply 
to such a situation as now before this court. In Waod 
v. A. H. Chambers Packing Company, (Wash.) 68 P. (2d) 
221, plaintiff, Wood, was employed by the highway de-
partment a few miles from his home. The workers 
assembled at 'the employer's office each morning to be 
transported to their work in the department's light truck. 
This car was used daily to carry the men and their tools 
to and from their place of work. The truck was kept at 
night in a garage some 'two miles from the office, and in 
the town where Wood lived. He and other workmen, 
living near him, generally rode in the truck from the 
garage to the office, but were not required to do so. 
Some of them used their own cars or rode to and from 
the garage with other employees. Whi1le returning in 
the truck from the department's office to his residence, 
Wood was injured in an intersection collision about 
· twenty minutes after his work day had ended. The sole 
question before the court was whether plaintiff was in-
jured in the course of his employment. The Washington 
Supreme Court ruled that he was not so injured. The 
opinion refused to place Wood within the exception of 
the V enho case, supra. In fact, it cited that decision as 
authority for the general rule that a workman going to 
or coming from the place of work is not in the course of 
his employment. 
".Appellant (Wood) comes squarely within 
the rule above stated, and not within the exception 
thereto. The automobile in which he was riding 
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at the time of the accident was not furnished as 
a part of appellant's contract of employment, nor 
was its use by him made, at all, for the /benefit of 
his employer to facilitate the progress of the work. 
It was merely an available means of transporta-
tion adopted by appellant for his own accommo-
dation.'' 
Another Washington opinion in point, and cited with 
approval in both the V enho and W:ood cases, supra, is 
Hama Hama Logging Co. v. Dept. of Labor, 288 P. 655. 
There the logging company furnished a track speeder 
for the chief purpose of carrying its employees from 
the work camp to the nearby town on week-ends for their 
personal business. It appears that the company's rail-
road from camp was the on~y way to reach town. Appel-
lant, Spears, worked regularly at the logging camp, and 
lived there during the week. His work week ended on 
Sat~rday night. He was injured while riding to town 
on the speeder the following Sunday morning, and evi-
dently for personal reasons. It should also be noted that 
h1s injuries were 'Caused by a collision between the 
speeder and the employer's logging train on the com-
pany's premises. The court ruled, however, that Spears 
was not furthering the interests of his empiloyer when 
injured, and denied his claim. 
"Those injuries were sustained on an occa-
sion when time was his own. He was making the 
trip from the camp on his own time and for his 
own personal business or pleasure. He was not 
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working. No one had any supervision over him. 
He was not receiving pay from his employer on 
the day he was injured. 
''The logging company merely permitted or 
authorized rts employees to ride on the speeder 
free of charge, as a convenience to the employees 
and not in the furtherance of its business. This 
is not a case wherein the employer has agreed to 
transport its employees to and from their work 
daily as a part of its contract with them. Here 
the employee sustained an injury when he was 
not performing any duty that he owed to his em-
ployer. The employer had no control over him 
whatsoever. The trip on which the employee had 
started was one of choice and was being made for 
persona~ reasons solely. The logging company's 
transporta:tion facilities afforded opportunity to 
the employee to enjoy periods of rest outside of 
the camp.'' 
The Washington court in Thompson v. Department 
of Labor ,and Industries, 116 P. (2d) 372, again affirmed 
the H ama H ama decision, supra, when it denied work-
man's compensation to parents of a boy killed while 
operating his employer's motorcycle. At the time, he 
was riding to his home for lunch after a morning's work. 
He was a delivery boy, and his employer testified that 
he was to make deliveries on his way to and from his 
home, whether at lunch time, or at night. He was per-
mitted to use the motorcycle for his travels home, and 
kept it at his residence each night. His employer paid 
all its operating expenses, and paid the boy a percentage 
of the profits. The court ruled that the case was no '[ 
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exception to the ru'le applicable to accidents occurring 
to an employee on his way to or from work. 
·'The Hama Hama case announces the gen-
eral rule in this state, and the Y enho case an-
nounces the exception to the general rule. 
'' "\Y e believe there is a clear distinction be-
tween cases such as the V enho case, where the 
employe is injurd while using or riding in a con-
veyance furnished or made available by the em-
ployer, and such use is necessary for, or an in-
cident to, the furtherance of the employer's busi-
ness, and the instant case, where the- employee is 
permitted, for his own convenience alone, to use 
a vehicle furnished by the employer.'' 
The rule of the Hama, Hama decision has again 
been invoked by the Washington Supreme Court in the 
recent case of McCarty v. King County Medical Service 
Corp., 175 P. (2d) 653. 
The Supreme Court of California has cited the 
Hama Hama case, supra, as one "clearly and correctly 
reasoned to a like conclusion with ours." In Graf et al 
v. Montecito County Water District, 34 P. (2d) 138, 
plaintiffs were employed on the construction of a dam 
and lived in camp at the work site. The company fur-
nished a train on Saturday nights to carry workers from 
the camp to Santa Barbara to visit relatives, or for other 
personal matters. The California court ruled that an 
accident which occurred to an emp~oyee while on such a 
trip did not occur in the course of his employment. 
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In another California decision, Boggess et ·al v. In-
drustri~al Accident Commission, et ,al, 169 Pac. 75, the facts 
are again very similar to those of the instant case. 
Fenner, employed regularly as a miner, was given leave 
to go to the town of Williams, some 30 miles from the 
mine on some personal business. He was to return on 
the local stage when he had finished his affairs. In Wil-
~iams he met his mine superintendent, who informed 
him that if he would assist in loading some mine trucks 
there, he could ride back to the mine that day. He did 
so, and while on the return trip was injured. The fact 
was that at the time Fenner was employed, "it was 
understood . . . that he was to do any work he was di-
rected to do, and it occasionally happened that miners 
were detailed to do work of this character.'' In setting 
aside the Commission's award for the employee, the 
California court commented: 
''His going to the mine on the truck, instead 
of by stage, was arranged merely as a matter of 
convenience to him. It was no part of his service. 
He was still in the process of returning to the 
mine in the pursuance of the arrangement by 
which he had left it temporarily. He has no more 
right under the law to claim compensation from 
Boggess for the injury which happened to him 
on the journey to the mine on ·the truck than he 
would have had if he had been riding on the stage 
as he first intended." 
The Minnesota Supreme Court has also ruled that 
transportation in a company-owned vehicle from the 
place of work to the employee's home, in a situation like 
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j[cKenzie's, is a mere convenience and does not place 
the trip within the· course of employment under the Com-
pensation Law. In Erickson v. St. Paul City Ry. Oo., 
169 N. W. 532, plaintiff was a member of the power 
company's crew engaged in repairing power lines around 
St. Paul, Minnesota. The company provided a truck, 
with a driver, in which the equipment used by the crew 
was carried and upon which crew members moved from 
one point on the line to another. The company itse1f 
did not convey the crew from their homes to their places 
of work and return. However, the driver kept the truck 
at his residence and on his daily trips to and from work 
made it a practice of picking up some of the crew. 
'':Members of the crew going in the direction tra¥eled 
by the truck were at liberty to ride ·on it if they wished, 
and availed themselves of this privilege whenever they 
found it convenient to do so.'' 
Wh1le returning home on the truck after work, the 
pla~tiff was injured in a traffic accident. The court 
determined that the accident did not arise in the course 
of the employment. 
"In the case at bar it will be noted that ·the 
accident happened after the employees had com-
pleted their day's work and had left their place 
of employment and while they were proceeding 
toward their restpective homes. AHhough they 
were riding on the truck of their employer, it 
clearly appears that their contract of employment 
imposed no obligations upon the emp1oyer to 
transport 'them to or from the place of work and 
that they were merely riding as licensees to ~erve 
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their own convenience. Their service for the day 
had terminated; they had left the place where 
such service had been performed and were no 
longer engaged in performing any service for 
their employer." 
In No·rwood v. Tellico, 244 8. W. 490 (Tenn), 24 
A.L.R. 1227, the employee himself, in a negligence action, 
took the position that he was not in the course of em-
ployment when injured while riding home gratis on his 
employer's logging train. It was the custom of the em-
ployees to ride to town from their camp at the end of 
the week in order to receive their pay checks. They 
usually rode the logging train each way. Plaintiff was 
returning from town when injured by what he claimed 
was the train operator's negligence. He had gone to 
town this certain week-end to see his father. His work 
was not to be resumed until the morning after the acci-
dent occurred. The court recognized that transporta-
tion may be furnished by the employer as an incident 
of the emp1oyment, and pursuant to agreement. But 
not so here. Observed the court: 
"It is true that he was riding on one of the 
defendant's trains, going to his home, but this 
was not an incident to his employment. He was 
returning from a social visit to his father. His 
employment with defendant did not begin until 
the foUowing day. He did not owe defendant any 
duty while thus returning to his home, and de-
fendant had no control whatever over him. The 
trip to his father's home, of which the return was 
a part, was not an incident to his employment 
but was purely personal.'' 
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The above Tennessee case cites as authority for its 
decision, Rausch v. Standard Sh ipbuildl:ing Oorporotion, 
181 X.Y.S. 513, and the English case of D·avi.es v. Rltym-
ney I ron Tr orks Co., 16 Times L. R. 329, 2 W. C. C. 22. 
In the first ease, the K ew York court held that a shipyard 
worker was not in the course of employment at the time 
he was injured on his way home from work. The ship-
yards were located on an island, and the employer, at 
the request of its workers, had chartered a ship to trans-
port them to and from the island. The employer was 
reimbursed for this expense by the United States Gov-
ernment. Boats of other concerns made the trip but 
they were inadequate. The deceased worker had used 
the company-furnished transportation for some time 
before he was fatally injured on board in a ship acci-
dent while returning home at the end of the week's work. 
The work day of the employees, including deceased, be-
gan and ended at the island. The court refused to find 
that the employee's death arose out of or in the course 
of his employment: 
"Concededly plaintiff's intes•tate's hours of 
work had ·expired, his work for the day and the 
week was over, and he had received his pay there-
for; he was being conveyed in a boat hired or 
chartered by the defendant, and which expense 
in no wise figured in the pay or wages of the 
plaintiff's intestate. To say that the death of 
plaintiff's intestate arose out of and in the course 
of his employment, and within the precincts of 
his then or theretofore employer, the Standard 
:Shipbuilding Corporation, seems to be extending 
the compass of the act to even a greater degree 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
34 
than in any case cited or which has come to the 
notice of this court.'' 
The English decision of Davies v. Rhymney Iron 
Works, supra, held that a workman injur,ed when return-
ing home on a train furnished by the employer for the 
convenience of the men, was not at the time in the course 
of his employment. In both that case and the Rwusch 
case, supra, the fact that the employer furnished trans-
portation specifically for the workers did not change the 
result. In the present case, we do not have this added 
factor to aid petitioner. The record contains no proof 
whatever that McKenzie's employer furnished him or 
any other employee transportation to and from work. 
The superintendent's use of the pickup or the Studebaker 
in which he incidentally allowed various employees to 
ride to their homes, cannot be so construed. Petitioner 
does not contend that if McKenzie had lived north of 
the Garland job he would have ridden home in the com-
pany's automobile. On the contrary, the evidence estab-
lishes without dispute that he, like the other employees, J! 
always would have had to depend on som·e other means :Ia 
of transportation. 
II 
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT DECEDENT 
RODE IN THE EMPLOYER'S AUTOMOBILE ONLY BY 
PERMISSION. 
Appellant's brief strenuously argues the question 
whether McKenzie obtained permission to ride home in 
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jured. Appellant asserts that the Commission eommitted 
error in finding that the deeeased obtained sueh permis-
sion and, of his own volition, chose to 1leave his plaee 
of employment for his home in Springville. Respond-
ents submit that there is substantial evidence to support 
this finding. Can it be said that McKenzie was entitled 
to ride in the company car as of right~ Neither the 
superintendent, the employer, Mr. Harold Whiting, nor 
any other employee who testified knew of any such right. 
Having no such right, :McKenzie could only have ridden 
home as he did with the permission of the employer, 
either expressed or implied. The permission need not 
have been expressly given on the day in question, but 
could have been given on a prior date, or by course of 
praetice or conduct. The decisions whieh respondents 
have above presented illustrate that such permission can 
be so given, and amounts to a mere accommodation or 
gratuity on the part of the employer. These decisions 
also prove that a finding by the Commission of such per-
mission is not at all a prerequisite to the ultimate finding 
that the injury did not arise out of or occur in the course 
of the employment. In many of these cases which reJ 
spondents have cited, the employer furnished regular 
transportation for the employees, and the employees 
used it. And yet the courts refused to bring the parties 
within the Workmen's Compensation Law. The deeisions 
do not rely upon or even refer to, a finding that the 
employee obt~ined permission at any time to so ride. 
Appellant's brief, further, admits that such a finding is 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
36 




In her brief, appellant rellies upon a number of 
decisions to sustain her contention that the Commission 
erred in denying her an award. Those cases, however, 
can be readily distinguished from the case at bar. In 
most of them, as in the Utah case of London GiMarontee 
v. Frazee, supra, the court was bound to sustain the 
ruling -of the trial court or of the Commission in favor 
of the. employee if it found substantial support in the 
evidence. In this McKenzie case that situation is re-
versed. Here the court must sustain the Commission's 
decision against petitioner unless its decision is arbi-
trary and capricious. Furthermore, in mos1t of the 
appellant's cases, transportation was determined to have 
been furnished as a necessary part of the job, or under 
an implied contract giving the right to demand the ride. 
The transportation was also avai'lable to all of the em-
ployees, and was nearly always the only means of travel 
used. In some of the appellant's cases the employer 
either told the workers that transportation would be 
furnished, or he directed them to use his transportation. 
:Bometimes, as in the Frazee case, decided by this court 
in 1947, the fact was established that the employee was 
paid for the time consumed in travel to his job, and that 
the employment contract "contemplated that Fraze·e was 
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to be an employee while on defendant's time en route 
to (his place of work)." Frazee, it will be recallled, was 
also furnished a pass on his employer's trains. Another 
important distinction between that case and the problem 
now before the court is that there the employer testified 
that the contract did include travel time. 
The United States Supreme court decision of Car-
diUo v. Liberty Mutual Insuromce Company, 330 U. S. 
469; 67 Sup. Ct. 801; 91 L. Ed. 1028, quoted in appellant's 
brief, does not fit our present case. There, the applicable 
federa'l statute, the Longshoreman's Act, provided that. 
jurisdiction under the Workman's Compensation Act for 
the District of Columbia '' 'is to be presumed in the 
absence of substantial evidence to the contrary'." The 
act applies to the injury or death of an employee '' irre-
spective of the place where the injury or death occurs.'' 
The Supreme Court not only emphasized these statutory 
provisions, but observed that ''the Deputy Commission-
er's findings as. to jurisdiction are entitled to great 
weight and will be rejected only when there is apparent 
error." The Deputy Commissioner, before whom the 
hearing had been conducted, awarded compensation on 
his finding that the injury arose out of the course of 
employment. The court also noted that the agreement 
between the 'Uinvon ~and ~the employer required the Zatter 
to fur'nish transport:at~on for its employees, and two 
dollars was paid to decedent tor this purpose at the time 
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he was killed while driving his car home t~om work. 
The peculiar facts in this case of our federal Supreme 
Court certainly make that decision no authority for 
plaintiff's claim that Owen McKenzie's injuries, and 
death therefrom, arose out of or in ·course of his em-
ployment. 
CONCLUSION 
The uncontradicted evidence in this case is that the 
decedent when fatally injured was traveling to Spring-
ville, Utah, at his own wish, for the sole purpose of 
reaching his home after a week's work at Garland, Utah. 
His pay time and work time, which were very definite, 
had, like that of the other emp[oyees, sto'prped some three 
hours prior to the accident. McKenzie and his fellow 
workers had to make what arrangements they could for 
transportation to and from their place of work, and they 
received no compensation or reimbursement from their 
employer for the time or money so spent. On various 
occasions, McKenzie had used a means of travel to his 
home other than in a company owned car. The only 
conclusion permissable from the evidence is that when 
McKenzie rode home in his employer's automobile, he 
did so only because he happened to live in Springville. 
If he had lived north, east or west of Gadand on the 
day of the accident, he would not have gone home in a 
company car, and he would not have been in the accident. 
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His ride in the Studebaker that fateful day was only 
the result of an accommodation on the part of the em-
ployer. Respondents therefore respectfully submit that 
the accident causing Owen ~fcKenzie 's death did not 
arise out of or in the course of his employment. The 
decision of the Commission denying compensation is not 
arbitrary or capricious but is supported by ample and 
undisputed testimony, and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER, 
Attorneys for Defendants 
and Respondents. 
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